Consensus algorithms have a set of network nodes converge asymptotically to a same state which depends on some function of their initial states. At the core of these algorithms is a linear iterative scheme where each node updates its current state based on its previous state and the state of its neighbors in the network. In this paper we review a proposal from control theory which uses linear iterative schemes of asymptotic consensus and observability theory to compute consensus states in a finite number of iterations. This proposal has low communication requirements which makes it attractive to address consensus problems in a limited resource environment such as edge computing. However it assumes static networks contrary to wireless edge computing networks which are often dynamic and prone to attacks. The main purpose of this paper is to assess the network conditions and attack scenarios where this algorithm can still be considered useful in practice to address consensus problems in IoT applications. We introduce some new lower and exact bounds which further improve the communication performance of the algorithm. We also have some technical contributions on how to speed up mitigation of malicious activities and handling network instabilities. Numerical results confirm the communication performance of the algorithm and the existence of scenarios where the system can be considered cost effective resilient to errors injected intentionally or unintentionally.
INTRODUCTION
Consensus problems arise whenever a set of network nodes seek to agree on a same value that depends on parameters distributed across a network. They are coordination problems such as rendezvous (Cortes et al., 2006) , agreement problems (Saber and Murray, 2003) , leader-following problems (Peng and Yang, 2009) , distributed fusion of sensor data (Xiao et al., 2005) , distributed optimization problems (Tsitsiklis et al., 1986) and many others. Consensus problems are often hidden in larger applications. Recently, blockchain and distributed update consensus algorithms have been proposed to address security and privacy of IoT nodes data exchanges (Christidis and Devetsikiotis, 2016; Bahga and Madisetti, 2016) . We also find consensus problems in service-oriented IoT applications (Li et al., 2014) , IoT resource allocation (Colistra et al., 2014) , and others (Pilloni et al., 2017; Carvin et al., 2014) . More consensus problems are likely to arise as IoT expands its applications, some of which, such as smart cities, because of security and the sheer volume of data generated, may require close to the sources data fusion and analytic.
At the core of consensus algorithms is a linear iterative scheme where each node updates its current state based on its previous state and the state of its neighbors in the network. Assume the consensus function f is for each node to compute the average sum of the initial states, i.e. f = 1 n ∑ n i=1 x i (0), for n is the number of network nodes and x i (0) the initial state of node i. Let also assume the computer network is modeled as an undirected graph G = (V, E) where V = {1, 2, . . . , n} stands for the set of nodes, and where the edge set E represents network links. Let N i denotes the set of nodes adjacent to node i in G. The average sum consensus problem is solved by a distributed average consensus algorithm where each node i computes iteratively the following local average sum:
Local averages in (1) are initially poor approximations of the true average sum as they are based on a partial sum of the initial states. However, local averages get increasingly closer to the true average as further iterations carry information from nodes that are further away from node i. The local average rule Toulouse, M. and in Equation (1) can be expressed in a more general form:
where W i j holds the coefficient of a weighted linear combination of x i and the values x j , j ∈ N i (note, the properties of W are summarized in the APPENDIX). Equation (2) is the core linear model found in all discrete linear consensus algorithms. The corresponding network wide update rule is as followed:
x(k + 1) = W x(k), k = 0, 1, . . .
where x(k) represents the state of the nodes at iteration k (x(k) = [x 1 (k), x 2 (k), . . . , x n (k)] T ).
In this paper we consider a consensus algorithm that we call exact consensus because consensus functions are computed exactly in a finite number of iterations. This algorithm has first been proposed in (Sundaram and Hadjicostis, 2008) . It is based on the same linear iterative scheme as in Equation (2) but interpreted differently. For asymptotic consensus, Equation (2) is a computational step in a distributed algorithm, it computes a refined approximation of the consensus state for node i. For exact consensus, Equation (2) is a linear encoding scheme.
This interpretation of the linear iterative scheme in Equation (2) as an encoding scheme is analogue to network coding protocols (Ahlswede et al., 2000) where, at the network layer, packets from different sources are recombined into a single packet to improve network's throughput. In Equation (2), states
x j (k), j ∈ N i , and state x i (k) are combined at iteration k to yield a new state x i (k + 1). State x i (k + 1) encodes the states of iteration k which is then forwarded to nodes j ∈ N i at iteration k + 1.
The second important contribution making exact consensus possible is the parallel drawn between linear iterative rules such Equation (2) and observability theory (Sundaram and Hadjicostis, 2013) . Observability theory is not foreign to consensus algorithms. It has been a central theme in approaches proposed by researchers in the control theory community to address security issues of asymptotic consensus algorithms (Pasqualetti et al., 2009; Teixeira et al., 2010; Silvestre et al., 2013) . Observer-based techniques in process control which detect faulty system components are adapted to detect and isolate data falsification attacks on asymptotic consensus iterations (Pasqualetti et al., 2007) .
In the context of exact consensus, observability theory is applied to recover in a finite number of steps the only guaranteed uncorrupted state of the system, i.e. state x(0) (in this paper we assume the initial states are genuine). The state x(0) is inferred by a node i from observations of states x j (k), j ∈ N i that flow through node i at each iteration of Equation (2). Once the initial states have been recovered by a node i, the consensus function is computed locally. This paper is structured as follow. Section 2 briefly describes the exact consensus algorithm. In Section 3 we introduce new lower and exact bounds on the number of communication steps for the algorithm, as well as a few technical approaches to compute these bounds. Section 4, briefly summarizes the algorithm in (Sundaram and Hadjicostis, 2011) , which is an extension of the algorithm in Section 2 to mitigate the hacking of some nodes by malicious actors. Section 5 is an assessment of the performance and potential of both algorithms based on numerical tests and technical proposals to improve the resilience of exact consensus. Section 6 concludes.
EXACT CONSENSUS
According to control theory, a system is observable to an external observer if its internal states can be inferred in finite time from observing a sequence of the system's outputs. In the context of the exact consensus algorithm, the internal system states are x(k), and the external observers are each node in the network. Each node observes a sequence of states that flows directly through it, i.e. its own state and the states of its neighbors. Then each node infers x(0), from the sequence of observations. Therefore we divide the presentation of the exact consensus algorithm into two sections. The observation phase deals with the recording of states that flow through a node. The recovery phase is related to the recovery of initial states from the stored encoded data.
Observation Phase
Let x be a state vector of n entries representing the current state of an n network nodes, and W a weight matrix. The following linear system models how information is recorded at node i:
The relevant quantity in Equation (4) is y i (k) = C i x(k) which specifies the values of x(k) observed by node i. At each iteration k, y i (k) stores (deg i + 1) states, i.e.
and y i (k) refer to two different sets of entries in y i . The size of
where v is the length of the sequence of observations performed by node i. C i is a (deg i + 1) × n matrix with a single 1 in each row, indicating the value of vector x(k) stored in
As an example, consider the ring network in Fig We focus on node 1 as external observer. The corresponding C 1 matrix is as followed:
The entries of y 1 are obtained as follow. We know from linear algebra that x(k) = W k x(0) for W k the product of matrix W with itself k times. Therefore,
. After v observations, the column vector y 1 would have stored the 3v states that have passed through node 1. The observation sequence of node i fills the column vector y i (0 : v − 1). As the example above suggests, the observation sequence is a mapping x(0) → y i (0 : v − 1) that can be represented in matrix form called the observability matrix, denoted as O i,v−1 :
The observability matrix for node 1 in the ring network of Figure 1 and 
. . .
The observability matrix is needed to decode the data in observation vector y i (0 : v − 1) in order to recover x(0) during the recovery phase.
Recovery Phase
After the observation phase, the column vector y i (0 : v − 1) of node i stores the initial state of all the other nodes in the network, though this information is stored in an encoded form. In order to compute a consensus function f , either f is mapped into an equivalent function f i that can be applied on the arguments provided by y i or a decoding function is applied on y i that recovers the initial state x(0).
Mapping f into f i
The consensus f is mapped into an equivalent function f i expressed in matrix form Γ i . First f is written in a matrix form Q. From linear algebra, if Q is in the row space of the matrix O i,v−1 , then linearly independent rows of O i,v−1 can be treated as a base for Q. The matrix Q is then expressed in terms of this new base. The new expression of Q is found by solving the following system of linear equations:
where Γ i computes f (x(0)) using the arguments available in the observation vector y i (0 : v − 1):
As an example consider the consensus function f = 1 n ∑ 4 i=1 x i (0) and the four nodes ring network in This system has infinitely many solutions, one is [−0.66, −0.33, −0.75, 2, −0.25, 1] which expresses Q in terms of a set of linearly independent rows of O 1,2 as a new base for Q.
Assume
We consider again the case of node 1. During the observation phase, after the first observation, the content of the column vector y 1 (0) is
After two observations, the column vector y T 1 = [1, 2, 4, 2.31, 2, 2.66]. According to Equation (8) the consensus value can be computed as 1 n ∑ 4 i=1 x i (0) = Γ i y i . Indeed, the product of Γ 1 y 1 = 2.46 ≈ 2.5, the difference is accounted for by rounding errors.
Recovering the Initial State x(0) from y i
The procedure to recover x(0) simply consists to solve Equation (8) for the identity matrix I n , assuming I n is the row space of O i,v−1 . If this the case, then I n is expressed in terms of a linear combination of rows in O i,v−1 , from which Γ i y i returns x(0). Consider the four nodes ring network in Figure 1 , to compute the average sum function, first the identity matrix I 4 is expressed in a base provided by the O 1,2 matrix, by solving the system of linear equations O T 1,2 Γ T 1 = I 4 :
   1 0 0 0.33 0.33 0.33 0 1 0 0.33 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0.33 0.33 0 0 1 0.33 0 0.33
The solution of this system of equations is as follows:
0.917 -0.028 -0.836 -0.082 -0.083 0.953 -0.336 -0.033 -0.083 -0.008 -0.336 0.869 0.250 0.083 -0.497 0.249 0.000 0.058 1.515 -0.149 0.000 -0.058 1.515 0.149
Assuming the initial values x i (0) of nodes 1 to 4 are the same as above, then y T 1 = [1, 2, 4, 2.31, 2, 2.66], the same as for the average sum example. One can verify that Γ 1 y 1 = [0.9965, 1.9994, 3.0598, 4.0015], rounding errors accounting for the differences. Node 1 has then learned the initial state of the system, therefore node 1 can computed directly the average sum using the f = ∑ n i=1 x i (0) or almost any other function of x(0).
The difference between mapping f to f and recovering x(0) from y i is mainly in the number of observations needed to compute each approach. As the number of columns in I n is the same as the number of columns in O i,v−1 , for I n to be in the row space of O i,v−1 , the matrix O i,v−1 has to be full column-rank. This usually requires more observations compared to solving for a matrix representation of the function f . On the other hand, computing the consensus function f directly from the arguments in y i requires a mapping f → f for each consensus function, which could be tedious. It is more simple to recover x(0), from which any consensus function can be computed.
The observability matrix O i,v−1 as well as Γ i are pre-computed for each node prior to the execution of the observation phase. The constitution of the observability matrix O i,v−1 depends on the weight matrix W , the matrix C i and the value of v which are known prior to the observation phase. Γ i depends on the function Q and O i,v−1 which are also known prior to the observation phase. Only Γ i needs to be stored by node i, the observability matrix is not needed during or after the observation phase.
In this brief description of the exact consensus algorithm several issues have been omitted on relations existing between the value of v, the coefficients of the weight matrix W , the rank of the observability matrix and the existence of a base in the row space of O i,v−1 for a given consensus function f . Discussions and results about these issues can be found in (Sundaram, 2009) . One open issue is finding better bounds on v. We address this issue in the next section.
BOUNDS ON THE NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
The length v of the sequence of observations is a communication cost that exact consensus incurs prior to compute the consensus function. It is important to reduce the number of observations in order to improve the efficiency of the algorithm. In this section we briefly recall known results in the literature on upper bounds for v. Then, we address open issues regarding the more difficult task of defining lower and exact bounds on the size of O i,v−1 .
In this section, we only consider the general case of Q = I, where we focus on the recovery of the initial state. We also assume that W is a random weight matrix. In order to recover the initial state of every node successfully, it is necessary and sufficient to have a full column-rank observability matrix O i,v−1 for all i. It is proven that random weight matrices can generate a full column-rank O i,v−1 for all i with probability equal to 1 (Sundaram, 2009 ).
Upper Bounds
The number of nodes n in the network is a trivial upper bound on the number of observations. According to the local update rule in Equation (1), at iteration k = 0, the initial state x i (0) of any node i is pushed to all its neighbors. For any node j ∈ N i , at iteration k = 1, the value x i (0) is pushed to all the neighbors of j, therefore after 2 iterations x i (0) has reached all the nodes at distance 2 for node i. In at most n iterations, x i (0), the initial value of node i, thought in an encoded form, will have been pushed to all the nodes in the network. In practice a better upper bound can be computed by noticing that a node i receives the initial values of all its neighbors in one iteration. Therefore, after the first iteration, each node i has received deg i + 1 initial values (including its own initial value). This yields the following upper bound on v (Sundaram and Hadjicostis, 2008) :
Lower Bounds
A trivial lower bound on the dimension of O i,v−1 is the diameter of the graph (Sundaram and Hadjicostis, 2008) . The intuition is that if the initial value of some node j does not reach node i, it cannot recover the state of node j by any mean. We call this lower bound the data availability requirement. Indeed, if this requirement does not hold, this means there exists two nodes i and j where the observations of node i do not depend on x j (0). This translates into an observability matrix O i,v−1 with all zero entries at the j-th column and therefore O i,v−1 is not full column-rank. However, the above lower bound is not tight in many cases. Consider a torus network such as the network of 25 nodes in Figure 2 . The diameter of this graph is 4. As torus is a regular graph, the dimensions of the matrix C i are the same for all nodes, it is 5 × 25 for the graph in Figure 2 . If the value of v is set to 4, the column vector y i for any node i is 5v = 20, the dimension of O i,v−1 is 20 × 25, this observability matrix has only 20 rows. Thus O i,3 cannot be full column-rank as the number of rows is less then the number of columns. This brings us to introduce a second condition on the minimum length the observation sequence must satisfy, we call this second condition the intake capacity requirement. In one observation, a node cannot gather more states than the number of links adjacent to it in the network. The lower bound according to this requirement could be formulated as n min i∈V (deg i )+1 , which implies that the observability matrix O i,v−1 for any node would have at least n rows. A better bound can be obtained by eliminating the rows which are obviously linearly dependent on other rows. Notice that, by definition, the state x i (k) is a linear combination of its state x i (k − 1) and the states of its neighbors x j (k −1), j ∈ N i of the previous iteration k −1. Therefore, at node i, x i (k) can be eliminated (except for the initial one x i (0)), thus there are only at most deg i independent states that are observed at each iteration. Put everything together, the lower bound corresponding to this requirement is:
However, this requirement does not cover the data availability requirement. Consider the graph in Figure 3. In this case, the minimum degree is 2 and thus, the lower bound according to the intake capacity requirement is 3, but the diameter is 4. These two requirements generate two different lower bounds which both need to be satisfied. Neither of these two bounds is tight however for the graph in Figure 3 which requires empirically a sequence of 5 observations.
Tight lower bounds must also consider local properties and the topology of the graph. Intuitively, bottlenecks are one of those properties. Bottlenecks for a particular node are those nodes in the graph which limit the intake capacity. For example, in Figure 3 , with respect to node 0, node 2 is a bottleneck. Though node 0 has two neighbors, this node can only extract one independent state observation of the part of the graph beyond node 2 (i.e. nodes 3 to 6). To examine this analytically, consider x 1 (k), k ≥ 1, which is the linear combination of x j (k − 1), j ∈ {0, 1, 2}. All those three states derived from observations of node 0 at iteration k − 1, therefore x 1 (k) always depends on existing observations of node 0 from iteration 1 and can be eliminated. This implies that observing the state of a same node twice would contribute nothing into recovering x(0). We derive a method to determine an exact lower bound on v for any graph, which is correct empirically, but with no proof. This method was also mentioned in (Sundaram, 2009 ) as a conjecture. For a specific node i, draw a spanning tree rooted at i which has the largest branch whose size is minimum. The number of observations requires at that particular node is equals to the size of that largest branch. For the graph in Figure 3 , and node 0, the number of iterations (which is 5) could be explained by looking at Figure 4 (node 0 is colored in red, the blue branch is the largest one and contains 5 edges, the green branch is the other branch of the tree).
Exact Bound for Symmetric Graphs
A symmetric graph is a graph where any pair of adjacent nodes could be mapped to another pair of adjacent nodes (Babai, 1995) . Formally, in a symmetric graph, for any two pairs of adjacent nodes (u 1 , v 1 ) and (u 2 , v 2 ), there exists an automorphism f such that f (u 1 ) = u 2 and f (v 1 ) = v 2 . Such a graph is both vertex-transitive (implying regularity) and edgetransitive, and the connectivity of any node is exactly d where d is the degree of every node in the graph.
The lower bound defines by the intake capacity requirement is tight for symmetric graphs, which is n−1 d . While we still don't have a formal proof, the intuition could be explained using the result in (Sundaram, 2009) , which states that the minimum size of the largest branch is the upper-bound on the number of observations with probability 1 (where the lower-bound is kept as a conjecture). In a symmetric graph, there exists a spanning tree whose branches have equal size or only have a difference of 1 (tree with balanced branches). Because a symmetric graph is a vertex-transitive graph (where any node has the same role), we only need to analyze a single node.
To draw such a spanning tree, consider any node as a reference node v 0 . The other nodes are organized into layers based on the distance between them and the reference node. Assign the nodes at distance 1 different labels (branch label). For any node at distance dist + 1, its label will be the union of the labels of its adjacent nodes at distance dist. This structure is shown in figure 5 and has some noticeable properties. First, because the connectivity of any node is exactly d, any layer (except for the last one) must have at least d nodes. Second, at any layer, the label counts of each branch are equal. This is because we can map any pair (v 0 , v 1 ) to (v 0 , v 2 ) where v 1 , v 2 are any pair of nodes at distance 1, thus the labels of v 1 could be map bijectively to the labels of v 2 . Based on these two properties, we can manually draw a tree with balanced branches, however we don't have yet an explicit procedure to draw this tree, though we confirmed this observation with many well-known symmetric graphs, as shown in figures 5, 6, and 7. 
RESILIENCE OF EXACT CONSENSUS
Implementations of the algorithm describe in Section 2 are susceptible to be hacked by malicious actors taking control of some nodes from which the current state of the nodes will be updated incorrectly. This form of attacks has been addressed in (Sundaram and Hadjicostis, 2011) where a solution approach is proposed. In this section we briefly describe the proposed attack model, the procedure detecting the existence of compromised nodes, the recovery procedure of x(0) in the presence of malicious actors and finally the identification and removal of compromised nodes.
Modeling Malicious Activities
Attacks are modeled as an additive error u i (k) to the linear iterative Equation (2) at any given iteration k of node i :
In matrix form, referring to the possibility that several nodes may be compromised, this is modeled as
where F = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i f } is the set of the compromised nodes, B F = e i 1 e i 2 · · · e i f (where e l denotes a unit vector with entry l storing 1) and u F (k) = u i 1 (k) u i 2 (k) · · · u i f (k) T . From this, the observation vector of a node i at iteration k is written as a linear combination of the initial states and the injected additive errors: 13) in which M F i,k is the fault matrix corresponding to the subset F of compromised nodes, defined as:
Detection
At the end of the observation phase, the algorithm run tests to detect malicious activities. Let κ be the vertexconnectivity of the graph. Assume that at some iteration L, for every subset S with size less then κ/2, O i,L and M S i,L satisfy this condition:
which means that every column in O i,L is linearly independent with the columns in M S i,L and O i,L is full column-rank (ρ denotes the rank of a matrix). If the coefficients of the weight matrix W are generated randomly, this condition will be satisfied with probability 1. From Equation (13), if there is any compromised node in the system, the following test will fail:
i.e. if there is no abnormal event happening in the system, the observation vector y i (0 : L) is a linear combination of columns in O i,L . Note that this is only true when L is large enough such that O i,L has already achieved full column-rank. If the test is passed, the recovery algorithm in section 2 could be used. Otherwise, a different recovery process must be applied to recover x(0). (14) is executed prior to the observation phase. If f , the number of potentially compromised nodes, is pre-determined (for reasons described in Section 5) than the test in Equation (14) only needs to be applied to subsets S of size f . Once an L has been found for which Equation (14) is satisfied for all subsets S, then the length of the observation phase is known, it is L + 1. We found empirically (see Section 5) that Equation (14) is successful even when condition S with size less then κ/2 is not satisfied.
The test in Equation

Recovery
If the presence of malicious activities has been detected, legitimate nodes could recover the initial states from their observation vector. The following procedure describes this recovery process.
Algorithm 1: Recovery algorithm.
1. Let f be equal to the (assumed) number of malicious nodes.
2. For each combination S of f nodes among n:
(a) If this test is passed:
then remember S and go to step 3. 
Malicious Nodes Identification
If the initial state can be recovered using x(0) = P S i,L y i (0 : L), then the modified state at iteration 1 could be calculated in the same way:
x(1) = P S i,L y i (1 : L + 1) Compare it with the expected state at iteration 1 x(1) = W x(0), the malicious nodes at iteration 1 could be identified. Conduct the consensus protocol and apply the same strategy until iteration L + l, if a node j is malicious at iteration l, then
where x(l) = P S i,L y i (l : L + l) and x(l) = W x(l − 1). Note that the next expected state is calculated based on the modified state, because that is the state nonmalicious nodes use in reality.
ASSESSMENT OF EXACT CONSENSUS
In this section we assess the exact consensus algorithms in sections 2 and 4 for their communication and computation cost, as well as resilience to attacks and network changes. This assessment derived from observations on the design of the algorithm as well as numerical results. Numerical results have been obtained from the insertion of each of the two exact consensus algorithms in a simulator for consensus based network intrusion detection (Toulouse et al., 2015) . For these simulations, we have run tests with 5 different regular network topologies: rings with 9 and 25 nodes, 2-D torus with 9 and 25 nodes and the Petersen graph (10 nodes 15 edges).
No Malicious Activities
In this section we assess the performance of the algorithm describes in Section 2. Column "Steps" in Table 1 lists the number of observations performed to recover x(0). Column "Time" displays the cost to recover x(0) = Γ i y i , expressed in millisecond on a dualcore 2.00 GHz CPU. The time results reported are averaged over 100000 runs of exact consensus. Clearly, the computation time is negligible, which makes the time complexity of this algorithm depends solely on the number of observations. Columns 10 −2 and 10 −10 report the convergence speed (number of iterations) of an asymptotic consensus algorithm which was substituted to exact algorithm in the simulations. The values in column 10 −2 are the number of iterations of the asymptotic algorithm to obtain a solution with a precision no less than 10 −2 from the true solution (similarly for the column 10 −10 ). We see that that the number of iterations for exact consensus is substantially lower compared to asymptotic consensus. It also worth noticing that the values in the column "Steps" follow the intake capacity lower bound tightly for the five network topologies. The performances of this algorithm are quite good. We now analyze the impact on the consensus function evaluation of errors that are introduced during the observation phase either intentionally (hackers) or unintentionally (system instability). Applications often have some tolerance to error in the consensus function evaluation, so maybe, as for asymptotic algorithms, this algorithm can be used to compute approximations of the true consensus value. Table 2 records the errors in the recovered initial states x(0) when every node injects random errors within some range. The header of each column indicates the value of the error injected. If a is the header of a column, then the injected error is drawn randomly and uniformly in the range [−10 a , 10 a ]. The entries of the table contain the error in x(0) represented in log 10 form, so if the value in an entry of Table 2 is b, then the raw error is 10 b . The raw error is the L 2 norm between the true x(0) and the recovered one. Results in Table 2 are based the same number of observations as in Table 1 for exact consensus.
The error in Table 2 grows linearly in the injected data range with coefficient 1. Fixing the linear coefficient (slope) at 1, let y be the injection range and x be the error (in log form), we have the model y = x + β where β is the base error. The base error is the intrinsic error of the system, which depends on the topology and represents the rounding error occurring during the calculation. The base error is estimated by β = y − x where y and x is the mean of y and x. The base error values are listed in Table 3 .
In table 3, a base error value of 4.01 means the system will lose over 4 decimal places of precision, no matter which floating-point format is being used. If the single-precision format (32-bit) is used with around 7 decimal places of precision, the recovered x(0) will only have 3 meaningful decimal places left. We observe from Table 3 that network topology with fewer degree performs worse than the one with more degree (e.g. Ring 9 < Petersen (10) < Torus 9, where a < b means a is worse than b). We also observe that the more nodes a network has, the more base error it will suffer. Overall, the results in Table 3 pretty much preclude the application of the exact consensus algorithm in Section 2 in an environment characterized by system instability and malicious activities.
Coping with Resilience Issues
In this section we first analyze numerically the strategy described in Section 4 for coping with malicious activities in the network. Then we discuss the applicability of this algorithm to handle attacks and network instability. Table 4 reports the performance of the algorithm in Section 4 for one and two compromised nodes. The column "Compromised" indicates the number of compromised nodes in the network. The column "Subsets" indicates the number n f of subsets of nodes the algorithm may have to examine before finding the subset of compromised nodes (step 2 of the recovery algorithm, Section 4.3). The column "Steps" displays the number of observations performed to recover x(0) (this number is pre-computed as defined in Section 4.3). The last three columns record the empirical time to execute the recovery algorithm, measured in millisecond. The best case happens when the first subset always passes the test in step 2a of the recovery algorithm and the same for the worst case with the last subset. For the average time, the malicious nodes are selected randomly at every run of the exact consensus. Time is averaged over 1000 consensus runs.
In Table 4 , "rank test is degenerate" means the system cannot calculate the rank of the matrix reliably anymore. The system uses SVD to calculate the rank. Rank is degenerated when the precision of the floating-point number (we used double floatingpoint number) is not enough for the system to decide whether a singular value is extremely small or it is zero. For the cases of ring 9 and ring 25 topologies, if there are 2 compromised nodes, this will separate the network, it is then mathematically impossible to recover x(0) at any node. Results in Table 4 show computation time greatly increases for scenarios where there are 2 compromised nodes. The minimum number of observations to recover x(0) also increases rapidly. For Torus 9, it goes from 2 when no attack to 3 and 5 respectively for one and two compromised nodes, similarly for Torus 25 with 6-8-12.
Note that we have run the recovery algorithm with 2 attackers for the Petersen graph which has a vertex connectivity κ = 3 and the 2D-Torus networks (9 and 25 nodes) with κ = 4. In both cases f = 2 ≥ κ/2. However, in both cases we have been able to find an L such that the test in Equation (14) is satisfied, allowing the recovery algorithm to compute x(0) for these last 3 network topologies.
Computational Time-complexity
The most time-consuming part of exact consensus in Section 4 is step 2 of the recovery procedure. The -11.8 -10.8 -10.0 -9.3 -8.4 -6.6 -5.7 -5.0 -4.4 -3.0 -0.2 -0.7 0.4 0.8 Torus 25
-10.5 -9.6 -8.5 -7.7 -5.9 -5.7 -4.7 -2.7 -1.5 -1.6 -0.8 0.8 1.3 3.2 Petersen -10.4 -10.6 -9.8 -8.9 -7.0 -6.0 -5.6 -4.2 -3.4 -1.1 -2.0 -1.0 0.3 2.1 number of subsets that may need to be tested is n f , therefore the algorithm is exponential in f . In practice, base on the results in Table 4 , this algorithm can only detect 2 malicious nodes or less. However, the time-complexity of the recovery algorithm grow in polynomial time in terms of the number of nodes n, but the order is high. The number of subsets for a specified n is O(n f ), but matrix multiplication and SVD also have their own time-complexity (which is O(n 3 )), which is in O(n f +3 ) in total. If the combination S is a superset of the set of malicious nodes F , S will still satisfy the test in Step 2a of the recovery algorithm. Therefore, if there is high probability that 2 malicious nodes will appear, we can set the starting of f to f = 2, and then use an alternating combination enumeration such as {0, 1}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}, . . . to cover all the subsets with 1 node in a first few trials. In this way, the computational time trying for the case f = 1 could be saved without any significant trade-off in performance. The same strategy could be applied for f = 3, however, it is harder to design an enumeration strategy which covers all the subsets of 2 nodes without repeating some subsets.
Dynamic Networks
The recovery of the initial states at a given node depends on information encoding rather than states diffusion. If changes occur in the network topology, sequences of information encoding will take place at run time that are not modeled in the pre-existing observability matrix. Despite some proposals for exact consensus in dynamic networks (Ahmad et al., 2012) , none can actually work reasonably in a network where node/link failures and removal may occur any where without informing the whole network. The proposal in (Ahmad et al., 2012) is limited to cyclic network topology changes. It assumes the existence of a pre-computed observability matrix for specific sequence of network topologies, changes in the network have take place according the sequence embedded in the observability matrix otherwise recovery of initial states will fail.
Our proposal to handle dynamic networks is to consider changes in the network configuration as a set of malicious nodes and apply the expensive recovery process of the algorithm in Section 4. Practically, as the detection algorithm can only recover the initial state with 2 malicious nodes, it's equivalent to 2 node failures or 1 link failure. The observation phase of exact consensus is relatively short, with an upper bound of n iterations. In contrast, the convergence speed of asymptotic consensus algorithms is slow, needing several iterations to compute a consensus solution. Thus, despite that exact consensus cannot tolerate many network changes, its speed makes modifications in the network configuration less likely to happen. And even if the system cannot recover in an initial observation phase, it can initiate a second observation phase to retransmit the data, whose total number of iterations will still be less than the time for a single asymptotic consensus phase. Therefore, exact consensus is still a useful solution in dynamic networks, which is applicable when the cost of transmission is high and the network is sufficiently stable.
CONCLUSION
The present paper describes an exact consensus algorithm which has proven low communication cost. Our numerical results further indicate that it should definitely be preferred to asymptotic consensus algorithms when the physical network is stable, reliable and secure. Further, as initial states are completely recovered by each node, different nodes can compute different functions of the initial states, they are not limited to compute the same consensus function. This extends the range of IoT applications of this algorithm beyond those related to consensus problems.
Exact consensus has a mathematically sound mitigation strategy to recover initial states from nodes compromised by malicious actors. Unfortunately it is known that this strategy does not scale well. Our tests and analysis have shown that this strategy is only reasonably applicable for attack scenarios involving 1 or 2 compromised nodes or for network configurations that are impacted by no more than 2 nodes failures or disappearances or by one link failure. However these scenarios are not too constraining. The algorithm has a procedure to identify and phase out compromised nodes once consensus has been computed, so that malicious actors will not accumulate in the system. The very short communication phase means that proportionally very few configuration changes can occur during a communication phase. An open question is looming in the context of distributed edge computing. Beyond the above limited scenarios of dynamic networks, can the linear encoding scheme of exact consensus be a substitute to the less communication efficient but more robust values diffusion gossip and flooding algorithms? Likely some answers to this question can be found in research on time-varying multihop networks in network coding and applications of observability theory to complex networks. This is the direction of our future research on exact consensus algorithms.
